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Abstract
We research the biomass power generation problem in 
the perspective of farmer contracting supply chain. By 
establishing a mathematical model and under the random 
yield and demand, a multiple farmer contract with a 
biomass power generation company problem in a two-
level supply chain is researched in this paper. We propose 
different mechanisms in two situations: under default risk 
and no default risk. And compare the optimal decision in 
different contracts. We find that the famers’ optimal input 
amount is always linear to the company’s order quantity; 
The company and farmers’ optimal decision quantity will 
both be improved under no default risk. However, the 
optimal input quantity by farmers will decrease with the 
increases of the compensation ratio in this situation.
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INTRODUCTION
Energy is the pillar of the development of the national 
economy. And play an important role in maintaining the 
rapid economic development and improvement of people’s 
living standards. Statistics shows that since 2006, the ratio 
of fossil fuels consumption is up to 87.9% to the total 
energy consumption in the world, of which the proportion 
of China is as high as 93.8%. China’s oil reserves are very 
small, proven reserves are only 1.3% of the world’s total 
reserves. Since 1993, domestic oil production has been in 
short supply, China has become a net oil imports country 
with an increasing demand. Based on the rich media, lean 
oil, less gas characteristics of fossil energy resources. 
China’s main energy dependence is coal which annual 
consumption in China is the second in the world. Wood 
Mackenzie, an energy research firm, said in a published 
report that although a series of measures to reduce coal 
consumption have been introduced and implemented, 
China’s annual coal consumption will rise to 7 billion 
tons by 2030, which is twice of the current annual 
consumption. As China’s largest stockpile and the most 
widely distributed non-renewable strategic resources, coal 
plays an important role in the development of economy 
in China. However, relying on the development of non-
renewable energy will encounter bottlenecks in the future. 
The renewable energy, which is abundant and green, 
comes into our vision because of the shortage of fossil 
fuels. Research on the use of renewable energy has also 
been rapidly developed. Whether traditional fossil fuels 
or renewable energy, they all play an important role in the 
field of power generation. According to the US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) report, the world’s 
fastest growing energy consumption will be in terms of 
electricity supply. EIA estimates that the global power 
generation will achieve an average annual growth rate of 
2.3% by 2035.
Although China is developing a series of policies to 
reduce the dependence on coal electricity, but it can’t curb 
the demand for coal. The use of coal power generation 
has caused some urgent problems, including the 
environmental pollution and the Greenhouse effect. Aware 
of the negative impact of coal electricity, there have been 
many countries focus on the development of renewable 
energy power generation. Denmark began to use biomass 
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energy since 1970. And in 1989, Denmark’s straw power 
generation project had been able to achieve profitability. 
However, China’s biomass power generation is still in the 
development stage.
China is a big agricultural country with nearly 70% 
of the peasant population. China’s rural areas are also 
hidden in a huge biomass energy resource in the context 
of the vast agricultural land area. Biomass energy can be 
raw materials for crop stalks, trees, etc. while because 
of the low use of straw, cereal leather and other biomass 
energy in China’s rural area. China has a very substantial 
potential in the biomass power generation industry. The 
Chinese government has begun to pay attention to the 
development of renewable energy power generation 
projects, and has stated that the renewable energy power 
generation will rise to an important level in the power 
supply system. With the support of government, there 
have been many attempts on building biomass power 
plants in China. The biomass power generation installed 
capacity in Anhui, a large agricultural province, has 
reached 278MW, generating capacity of 153MW·h per 
year. Henan Province also has a unique natural resource in 
developing the biomass power generation with an average 
70 million tons annually straw production. However, due 
to the lack of experience, high production cost and the 
instability in the supply of raw materials, the vast majority 
of biomass power companies are at a loss. We’ll focus on 
the problems listed above by researching a two-echelon 
supply chain with farmers and the biomass generation 
company.
1. LITERATURE
In the traditional power generation companies, coal is 
closely related to the upstream industry. While due to 
the instability of coal price and the determined price of 
electricity. The coal contract price negotiation is extremely 
fierce. And the conflict caused by the profit is becoming 
more and more difficult. The biomass power contract of 
“Company +Farmer” will provide a viable solution to the 
conflict. 
Research on the contract farming supply chain has 
been developed rapidly. He et al. (2008) analyzed the 
supplier and the manufacture’s profit under yield and 
demand uncertainty. They discussed the different revenue 
in the centralized model, no risk sharing model and risk 
sharing model. Hu et al. (2013) analyzed the optimal order 
strategy for the manufacturer under a two-echelon supply 
chain with yield and demand uncertainty. Centralized 
model and decentralized model are established to study 
the expected revenue of the supply chain. And a revenue 
sharing order contract is proposed to coordinate the supply 
chain. Zhang (2009) established a tripartite, farmer, 
government and the company, coordination mechanisms 
based on the distribution of farmers in China through 
the big system theory. A contract incentive and profit 
return mechanism were proposed to reduce operating 
cost and maximize the profit of the whole supply chain. 
But all models are established on the assumption that the 
farmer is a single group. Huh et al. (2012) researched the 
expected profit of an agriculture product manufacturer 
with multiple farmer supply chain under demand 
uncertainty. Three different models were discussed to 
estimate the best choice for the manufacturer. It’s find 
that the manufacturer’s maximum profit will be achieved 
in reneging-contract. But it neglected the influence of 
the farmers’ optimal input quantity the supply chain. 
Huang et al. (2012) further researched the coordination 
mechanism of rewards and punishments and revenue-
return contracts in the three-stage biomass supply chain 
which is consisted of energy company, production base 
and farmers to achieve the maximum expected profit to 
all parties in the supply chain. With the development of 
biomass energy, some scholars have begun to study the 
biomass power contract of “Company +Farmer” supply 
chain. Nasiri et al. (2009) analyzed a three-stage supply 
chain consists of farmer, electricity generation company 
and the electricity consumer to investigate the optimal 
strategy for them with incentive. Wang (2001) expands 
the model and analyzed the game strategy between the 
farmers, the middle purchaser and the power generation 
enterprise. The dynamic game under complete information 
and incomplete information (uncertainty of straw quality) 
biomass electricity supply chain are analyzed respectively. 
The government subsidy and some detailed-costs are 
considered into the model to estimate the revenue of the 
supply chain. We can find that there is rarely research on 
the biomass power contract of “Company +Farmer” under 
default risk. Because of the short-sighted characteristic 
of farmers, the default situation often occurs in reality. 
A suitable mechanism design for the supply chain under 
default risk is worthy of further study. So we established 
a biomass power contract of “Company +Farmer” supply 
chain under default risk based on the model of Fuzhan 
Nasiri and Woonghee Tim Huh’s. The influence of the 
default risk to the optimal order and input decision is 
further studied in this paper. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 
will set different models in two situations. Section 4 is the 
analysis of the models. And we summarize the results in 
Section 5.
2. MODEL 
In this paper, we research a farm-contracting supply 
chain with a single biomass power generation company 
and multi-farmer. The decision of the company and each 
farmer is based on the maximization of their own profit. 
The supply chain structure is shown in Figure 1. Since 
the area of arable land per household in the rural area is 
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allocated by the population in China. We assume that the 
land area per household is the same. And the optimal input 
amount is the same for each farmer, too. The company 
will propose a certain contract order quantity based on 
the contract price to farmers before the realization of the 
biomass. And the demand for biomass power is variable. 
Farmers will decide an optimal input quantity according 
to company’s order, operation cost and the contract price 
which are random yield. Some assumptions and symbols 
in are listed below. 
 
retail price P  
q or nuQ  
demand x  order q  
supply nuQ  Farmer 2 
CompanyE Power 
Market 
Farmer n  
Farmer 1  
contract price ω  
…
…
 
Figure 1
The Structure of the Supply
Assumptions:
(a)  Power generation company and farmers’ decisions 
are based on maximizing their own profit. 
(b)  Farmers’ operating cost are positively related to 
the input amount, and the total operating cost is 
CQ.
(c)  The excess biomass produced by the farmer has 
no salvage value.
(d)  The information between farmers and the power 
generation company is complete and reciprocal.
Related symbols:
Deterministic parameters
F Farmer
E Power company
n Famer numbers
C Farmers’ operating cost 
Ce Emergency order price for material 
ω Contract price 
P  Electricity sales price in the biomass power 
generation market
y Company’s operating cost
α  The compensation ratio of the power generation 
company to the emergency order cost (0< α < 1)
πθ#  The profit function of the main party of supply 
chain. θ for different parties, # for different 
mechanism.
Stochastic parameters
u  The random yield variable of the material with 
density function f(u) and cumulative distribution 
function F(u), E[u]=u
—
x  The random demand variable of the biomass 
power with density function g(x) and cumulative 
distribution function G(x), E[x]=x
—
v  The random conversion rate of the biomass 
power with density function h(v) and cumulative 
distribution function H(v), E[v]=v
—
Decision variables
Q  The amount of every farmer input, Q* is the 
optimal decision
q  The amount of company ordered, q* is the 
optimal decision
2.1 Centralized Model 
The centralized model is used as a benchmark model for 
comparison. The supply chain profit function is:
                                                      0 u, , 0 0 0
= [min{ , ] [ ]x vP E nuvQ x nCQ E ynuQ vπ ⋅ − −  .                             (1)
Lemma 1. The supply chain profit is concave in Q0, and the optimal Q*0 satisfies:
                                                
00 0
( ) ( ) ( )
nuQ v
C yuvv u g x dxf u duh v dv
P
∞ ∞ ∞ +
=∫ ∫ ∫  .                 (2)
2.2 The Production and Order Strategy Under No 
Default Risk
In this case, the company will always procure q to product 
the biomass electricity. While q>nuQ, the emergency 
order will be operated to fulfill the unmet order. The 
emergency order price is Ce(Ce>C). Three mechanisms 
are researched in this part.
2.2.1 Famers Bear the Emergency Order Cost
While q>nuQ, the farmer will bear all the emergency 
order cost. And the famer’s profit function is:
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[( )]F e uq C E q nuQ nCQπ ω= ⋅ − ⋅ − − . (3)
The first part is the revenue from the contract. The 
second part is the emergency order cost. The third part is 
the operation cost. 
Lemma 2. πF11 is concave in Q11, and the optimal Q*11 
satisfies:
   11
0
( )
q
nQ
e
Cuf u du
C
=∫ . (4)
From (4)  we know that  for  0 ( ) ( )
m
uf u du H m=∫
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q
nQ
.  Thus H(m) is a monotonically 
increasing function, and there is a unique solution for 
 0 ( ) ( )
m
uf u du H m=∫
 
( )
( ) 0
H m mf m
m
∂
= >
∂
 
11
q
nQ in (4).
If Q*11=M11q, then M11 is a constant parameter related 
to C,Ce , f(·) and n. M11 increases with the increase of Ce , 
and decreases with the increase of C and n.
Lemma 2 denotes that the famers’ input Q11 amount 
is linear to the company’s order quantity q .  The 
proportional coefficient is M11 which is determined 
by the operation cost, emergency order price and the 
number of farmers.
The company’s expected profit is 
 
 11 ,
[min{ }, ] [ ]E x v qP E qv x E yqvπ ω= ⋅ − ⋅ − . (5)
The first part is the sales revenue. The second part 
is the contract-procurement cost. The third part is the 
production cost.
Lemma 3. The company’s expected profit πE11 is 
concave in q11. and the optimal q*11 satisfies
   
0
( ) ( )
qv
yvvg x dxh v dv
P
ω∞ ∞ +
=∫ ∫ . (6)
2.2.2 Famers and Company Share the Emergency 
Order Cost
In this mechanism, the company will share the emergency 
order cost with farmers. While q>nuQ, the company will 
share α part of the cost. And farmers will bear the left 1－
α part cost. Then the farmers’ expected profit is 
                                                    
+
12 12 12 12[min{ , }] (1 ) [( ) ]
F
u e uE nuQ q C E q nuQ nCQπ ω α= ⋅ − − − −  .                    (7)
The first part is the revenue from the contract. The second part is the emergency order cost farmers bear. The third 
part is the operation cost.
Lemma 4. πE12 is concave in Q12, and the optimal Q*12 satisfies
                                                        120 ( ) (1 )
q
nQ
e
Cuf u du
Cω α
=
+ −∫    . (8)
If Q*12=M12q, then M12 is a constant parameter related to C,
e, α ,ω , f(·) and n. M12 increases with the increase of Ce and ω, and decreases with the increase of C, α and n.
The company’s expected profit is
  
 12 , 12 12
[min{ }] [( ) ] [min{ , } [ ], ]E x v e u uP E C E q nuQ E nuq Q q E y vv x qπ α ω
+= ⋅ − − − ⋅ − . (9)
The first part is the sales revenue. The second part is 
the emergency order cost company bear. The third part 
is the contract-procurement cost. And the last part is the 
production cost.
Lemma 5. The company’s expected profit πE12 is 
concave in q12. and the optimal q*12 satisfies
    
121/
120
0
( ) (1 ) ( )
( ) ( )
nM
e
qv
yv C nuM f u du
vg x dxh v dv
P
ω α ω∞ ∞ + + − −
= ∫∫ ∫ . (10)
We can know that q*12 is decreases with the increase of 
α. Since the larger α, the higher cost the company share.
2.2.3 Famers and Company Share the Yield Risk
In this case, farmers will compensate for company’s 
replenishment cost when q>nuQ. The compensation 
coefficient is b. While the company will compensate for 
farmers’ excessive output with compensation coefficient t.
Then the farmers’ expected profit function is 
  
 13 13 13 13 13
[min{ , }] b [( ) ] t [( ) ] nCF u u uE nuQ q E q nuQ E nuQ q Qπ ω
+ += ⋅ − − + − − . (11)
The first part is the revenue from the contract. The 
second part is the compensate cost to the company. The 
third part is the compensation from the company. And the 
last part is the operation cost.
Lemma 6. π F13 is concave in Q13, and the optimal Q*13 
satisfies
                                             130 ( )
q
nQ C tuuf u du
b tω
−
=
+ −∫ .                                                         (12)
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If Q*13=M13q, then M13 is a constant parameter related 
to C, b , t , ω , f(·) and n. M13 increases with the increase 
of b and ω, and decreases with the increase of Cand n.
The company’s expected profit is
    
13 , 13 13 12
13
[min{ }] [( ) ] [( ) ] [( ) ]
[min{ , }
,
] [ ]
E
x v u u e u
u
P E bE q nuQ tE nuQ q C E q nuQ
E nuQ q E yqv
qv xπ
ω
+ + += ⋅ + − − − − −
− ⋅ − .
 (13)
The first part is the sales revenue. The second part and 
third part are the compensation from and to the farmers, 
respectively. The forth part is the emergency order cost. 
The fifth part is the contract-procurement cost. And the 
last part is the production cost.
Lemma 7. The company’s expected profit πE13 is 
concave in q13. and the optimal q*13 satisfies
  
131/
13 130 0
0
( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
( ) ( )
nM
e
qv
yv b t C nuM f u du t nuM f u du
vg x dxh v dv
P
ω ω
∞
∞ ∞ + + + − − − + −
= ∫ ∫∫ ∫ . (14)
2.3 The Production and Order Strategy Under 
Default Risk
Default risk is common in contract farming supply chain 
because of the short-sighted farmers. Therefore, farmers 
will take no responsibility for the short of the biomass 
material. Two different situations are discussed in this 
part. 
No emergency order.  The company wil l  buy 
min{nuQ21,q}from farmers. 
The company bear the emergency order cost. The 
company will make up for the shortage of the biomass 
material. 
2.3.1 No Emergency Order 
Farmers will not make up for the shortage in this model if 
q>nuQ.
Then the farmers’ expected profit function is 
  21 21 21
[min{ , }]F uE nuQ q nCQπ ω= ⋅ −  . (15)
The first part is the revenue from the contract. And the 
second part is the operation cost.
Lemma 8. π F21 is concave in Q21, and the optimal Q*21 
satisfies
   210 ( )
q
nQ Cuf u du
ω
=∫ . (16)
If Q*21=M21q, then M21 is a constant parameter related 
to C, ω , f(·) and n. M21 increases with the increase of ω, 
and decreases with the increase of Cand n.
The company’s expected profit is
   
 21 , , 21 21
[min{ }] {( )[min{ ], , , } }E u x v uP E Q E E yvqv x nu qv nuQπ ω= ⋅ − ⋅ + . (17)
The first part is the sales revenue. The second part is 
the contract-procurement cost and the production cost.
Lemma 9. The company’s expected profit π E21 is 
concave in q21. and the optimal q*21 satisfies
    (18)
 21 21
21
21
1
1 210 0 0
1
210
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )[1 (1 ) ( ) ]
nM
qv nuM qv
nM
nM
vg x dxf u duh v dv nuM vg x dxf u duh v dv
yv nuM f u du
P
ω
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
+
+ − −
=
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
∫ .
2.3.2 The Company Bear the Emergency Order 
Cost 
Different with the previous model. The company will 
make up for the shortage material when q > nuQ. 
Then the farmers’ expected profit function is same with 
the previous one 
                                                    
 22 22 22
[min{ , }]F uE nuQ q nCQπ ω= ⋅ − .                                                        (19)
Lemma 10. π F22 is concave in Q22, and the optimal Q*22 satisfies
                                                        22
0
( )
q
nQ Cuf u du
ω
=∫ .                                                        (20)
If Q*22=M22q , Then the company’s expected profit is
  
 22 , 12 22
[min{ }] [( ) ] [min{ , ], }] [E x v e u uP E C E q nuQ E nuQ q E yqv vq xπ ω
+= ⋅ − − − ⋅ − . (21)
The first part is the sales revenue. The second part is 
the emergency order cost. The third part is the contract-
procurement cost. And the last part is the production 
cost.
Lemma 11. The company’s expected profit π E22 is 
concave in q22. and the optimal q*22 satisfies
                
121/
120
0
( ) (1 ) ( )
( ) ( )
nM
e
qv
yv C nuM f u du
vg x dxh v dv
P
ω ω∞ ∞ + + − −
= ∫∫ ∫ .                            (22)
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3. ANALYSIS 
3.1 The Comparison of M
(a) M21=M22; (2) M11>M21; (3) M12>M21.
(b) Because the farmers don’t have to make up for 
lack of biomass under default risk situation. We can know 
M21=M22 from Formula (16) and (20).
(c) Because of the monotonically increasing of 
 0( ) ( )
m
H m uf u du= ∫  and Ce>ω , M11>M21 is approved 
according to Formula (4) and (16).
(d) For 0<α<1 and the monotonically increasing 
of  0( ) ( )
m
H m uf u du= ∫ .  It’s obviously that M12>M21 
according to formula (8) and (16). We find that model 3.2.2 
would be equal to model 3.3.2 when α=1.
The M can be considered as the risk sharing ratio 
for farmers in different mechanisms. Farmers will 
input more to meet the requirement from the company 
when M is large. It means that farmers will take the 
majority of the responsibility for material shortage 
risk. On the contrary, farmers will input less to meet 
the same requirement from the company when M is 
small. Farmers is willing to input more under no default 
risk compare to the other situation because of high 
emergency order cost. 
Since the compensation efficient α is uncertain, we 
can’t compare the level of M11 and M12. If α satisfies 
ω+(1－α)=Ce. The farmers will face the same situation 
in model 3.2.1 and model 3.2.2. When α is high enough 
to meet ω+(1－α)>Ce.. The farmers will share more 
emergency order cost and input more to meet the 
company’s requirement. However, if ω+(1－α)<Ce. The 
company will share the majority of the emergency cost. 
And farmers have no motivation to improve their input in 
this situation.
3.2 The Comparison of the Optimal Order 
Quantity
(a) q*11 > q*22; (2) q*12 > q*22 ; 
(b) since q*11 satisfies 
 
0
( ) ( )
qv
yvvg x dxh v dv
P
ω∞ ∞ +
=∫ ∫ .
and q*22 satisfies
 
121/
120
0
( ) (1 ) ( )
( ) ( )
nM
e
qv
yv C nuM f u du
vg x dxh v dv
P
ω ω∞ ∞ + + − −
= ∫∫ ∫  .
For Ce > ω and 
 
121/
120
( ) (1 ) ( ) 0
nM
eC nuM f u duω− − >∫ .
We can know that q *11 > q *22 according to the 
cumulative distribution function of G(x). It’s denoted 
that the company will reduce the order quantity if 
the emergency order cost is born by the company 
alone.
(c) We can see that q*12 > q*22; from formula (10) and (22) 
for the same reason ibid . 
Also, if α satisfies αCe-ω=0.The compensation 
price to the farmers is equal to the contract price. 
The company’s optimal order quantity is equal (q*11 = 
q*12). When α is high enough to meet αCe-ω>0. The 
company will reduce the order quantity to avoid the high 
compensation cost. On the contrary, the company will 
increase the order quantity if αCe-ω<0.
3.3 The Comparison of the Optimal Input 
Quantity
(a) Q*11 > Q*22,
(b) Q*12 > Q*22.
We can get the conclusion from equation Q=Mq. This 
is consistent with common sense. The farmers will input 
more to meet the requirement because of the high cost of 
emergency order. 
From Formula (4) and (8) we can see that
* *
11 12Q Q= if 0eCα ω− = . 
* *
11 12Q Q> if 0eCα ω− > . 
* *
11 12Q Q< if 0eCα ω− < . 
It means that when the company improves the 
compensation level α. The farmers will decrease their 
input quantity. This is deviate from our common sense. 
The reason for that is the order quantity will decrease by 
the company if α is high because of the high emergency 
order cost company share. And the farmers will decrease 
their input quantity faced with a lower order quantity, 
respectively. 
CONCLUSION
We research the biomass power generation problem in 
the perspective of farmer contracting supply chain. By 
establishing a mathematical model and under the random 
yield and demand, a multiple farmer contract with a 
biomass power generation company problem in a two-
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327.
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fa rming wi th  poss ib le  reneging  in  a  developing 
country: Can it work? IIMB Management Review, (24), 
187-202.
Lin, W. G., & Song, W. L. (2005). Power production from 
biomass in Denmark. Journal of Fuel Chemistry and 
Technology, (6), 650-655.
Luo, D. K. (2001). Develop the marginal oil reserves 
to protect the national oil safety. China Energy, (7), 
121-14.
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Energy Policy, (37), 4514-4522.
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structure of biomass supply logistics based on transaction 
cost. Logistics Technology, (29), 106-108.
Tan, Z. F., Yu, C., & Jiang, H. Y. (2011). Risk and benefit 
balance optimization models of contract negotiation 
b e t w e e n  c o a l  s u p p l i e r s  a n d  p o w e r  g e n e r a t o r s . 
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, (31), 2108- 
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biomass power generation in Henan Province. Business 
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level supply chain is researched in this paper. We propose 
five different mechanisms in two situations: under default 
risk and no default risk. And compare the optimal decision 
in different contracts. We find that: (a) The famers’ optimal 
input amount is always linear to the company’s order 
quantity. And the proportional coefficient is determined by 
some certain constant and the contract mechanisms. (b) The 
company and farmers’ optimal decision quantity will both 
be improved under no default risk. Because the farmers 
will share the emergency order cost with the company and 
try to avoid pay this by improving the input quantity. (c) 
The optimal input quantity by farmers will decrease with 
the increases of the compensation ratio because of the 
decrease of the order quantity. However, the agriculture 
product is seasonality and low-quality. Besides, there is 
transportation and inventory cost in reality. More factors 
can be considered into the model in the future. 
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